Workshop Description
For AI researchers, privacy engineers, and FL platform architects. Covers secure aggregation protocol vulnerabilities under quantum attack, HE scheme quantum resistance assessment, differential privacy channel exposure, PQC migration for TFF, PySyft, and FATE, and framework-specific migration paths.
Federated learning relies on a layered stack of cryptographic primitives to keep individual participant data private while enabling collective model improvement. Secure aggregation protocols use Diffie-Hellman key agreement and secret sharing to mask individual gradient updates. Homomorphic encryption (CKKS, BFV, BGV) enables computation on encrypted model parameters. Differential privacy adds calibrated noise, but the channels delivering those guarantees depend on classical key exchange. A cryptographically relevant quantum computer running Shor's algorithm would break the ECDH key exchange underpinning secure aggregation, exposing individual model updates to an adversary who captured the encrypted traffic. The harvest-now-decrypt-later threat means this data is already at risk. This workshop maps each cryptographic dependency in production FL frameworks, assesses which primitives are quantum-vulnerable and which (particularly lattice-based HE) already provide quantum resistance, and builds a migration plan that replaces vulnerable components with FIPS 203/204/205 post-quantum algorithms without breaking existing FL workflows.
What participants cover
- Secure aggregation protocol cryptographic dependencies: where ECDH, secret sharing, and threshold encryption create quantum-vulnerable attack surfaces in FL pipelines
- Homomorphic encryption quantum resistance: why lattice-based HE schemes (CKKS, BFV, BGV) provide inherent resistance while their key management and transport layers may not
- Differential privacy channel exposure: the distinction between DP noise mechanisms (quantum-safe) and the cryptographic channels delivering DP guarantees (often quantum-vulnerable)
- Framework-specific analysis: cryptographic dependency maps for TensorFlow Federated, PySyft, and FATE with migration entry points for each
- PQC migration for FL: replacing ECDH with ML-KEM (FIPS 203), ECDSA with ML-DSA (FIPS 204), and planning hybrid transition strategies that avoid doubling communication overhead
- Compliance and regulatory context: EU AI Act, NIST AI RMF, and sector-specific data protection requirements intersecting with post-quantum migration timelines