Workshop Description
Emergency service drone fleets operate in environments where command link compromise has immediate safety consequences. A spoofed waypoint command during a search and rescue operation or a hijacked surveillance feed during a firearms incident creates risk to life. The cryptographic protocols securing these links (MAVLink v2 message signing, DJI SDK authentication, proprietary C2 encryption) rely on classical algorithms that quantum computing will eventually break. The migration challenge is that UAS platforms have long procurement cycles, constrained firmware update capabilities, and operate under CAA/EASA regulations that mandate specific security properties.
This workshop maps the cryptographic attack surface of a typical emergency service UAS deployment: command and control links (GCS to drone), telemetry and sensor data channels, video downlinks, geofencing enforcement mechanisms, UTM (Unmanned Traffic Management) system authentication, and fleet management platform security. For each attack surface, we identify the specific cryptographic algorithms at risk, assess the quantum threat timeline, and evaluate PQC replacement options within the constraints of embedded drone processors, bandwidth-limited datalinks, and regulatory certification requirements. The workshop covers STANAG 4586 interoperability implications and UK CAA/EASA drone regulation security requirements.
What participants cover
- MAVLink v2 command link security: message signing with SHA-256 HMAC, timestamp-based replay protection, and quantum vulnerability of the underlying authentication mechanism
- DJI SDK and proprietary platform authentication: certificate-based device pairing, firmware signing, and the quantum risk to commercial-off-the-shelf drone platforms used by emergency services
- Sensor data integrity: ensuring camera feeds, LIDAR point clouds, and thermal imagery cannot be tampered with in transit from drone to ground control station
- Geofencing cryptographic controls: signed geofence boundary definitions, altitude restriction enforcement, and the impact of signature forgery on no-fly zone compliance
- UTM security architecture: CAA/EASA Unmanned Traffic Management authentication, electronic identification (Remote ID), and PQC implications for airspace deconfliction
- PQC migration constraints for embedded UAS platforms: processor limitations, datalink bandwidth, firmware update mechanisms, and regulatory recertification requirements