Workshop Description
Organisations retain encrypted data for years or decades under statutory and regulatory obligations. Financial records under MiFID II may be held for seven years. Medical records persist for decades. Privileged legal communications have no expiry. All of this data is currently protected by RSA and elliptic curve cryptography that a sufficiently capable quantum computer would break. The harvest-now-decrypt-later (HNDL) threat means adversaries can capture encrypted data today and decrypt it when quantum hardware matures. The legal question is whether organisations that know this risk exists, yet continue to retain data under vulnerable encryption, are meeting their duty of care.
GDPR Article 32 requires "appropriate technical and organisational measures" that account for the "state of the art." As NIST finalises post-quantum standards and national agencies issue migration guidance, the argument that quantum risk is speculative weakens. This workshop examines how courts and regulators are likely to interpret these obligations, identifies the sector-specific retention periods that create the longest quantum exposure windows, and provides a framework for documenting quantum-aware decisions that create a defensible compliance record.
What participants cover
- GDPR Article 32 "state of the art" interpretation: when quantum-resistant encryption becomes the expected standard
- Harvest-now-decrypt-later liability: the legal exposure from adversaries capturing encrypted data for future quantum decryption
- Sector-specific retention analysis: MiFID II, PSD2, NHS, SRA, and Sarbanes-Oxley retention periods mapped against quantum threat timelines
- Board-level risk documentation: translating quantum cryptographic vulnerability into Companies Act 2006 directors duties language
- Cyber insurance and D&O implications: how quantum risk disclosure affects coverage terms and director liability
- Data minimisation as risk reduction: deleting data beyond its required retention period to eliminate quantum exposure