Workshop Description
For risk, security, and compliance teams at nuclear operators and energy infrastructure owners. Covers quantum threat modelling for safety-critical systems, NRC 10 CFR 73.54 and IAEA NSS-17-T compliance, consequence analysis for cryptographic failures in reactor protection and safety instrumented systems, and board-level governance for quantum risk.
Nuclear facilities operate under regulatory frameworks that require cryptographic protection of safety-related digital assets, yet the quantum threat to these cryptographic foundations is not yet reflected in most facility security plans. Reactor protection systems, safety instrumented systems (SIS), and emergency core cooling controls rely on RSA and ECDSA for authentication and integrity verification. A cryptographically relevant quantum computer would invalidate these protections on assets with operational lifetimes of 40-60 years. The harvest-now-decrypt-later threat is particularly acute for nuclear facilities: classified design documentation, safety system telemetry, and fuel cycle data have intelligence value that extends well beyond the typical IT data retention horizon. This session provides a structured methodology for assessing quantum risk within existing nuclear safety governance, mapping cryptographic dependencies to safety significance classifications, and preparing a regulatory engagement strategy before quantum-specific compliance requirements become mandatory.
What participants cover
- Quantum threat timeline: CRQC development estimates, harvest-now-decrypt-later exposure for nuclear data classifications, and nation-state threat modelling for facility-level risk assessment
- NRC 10 CFR 73.54 compliance: cryptographic requirements for safety-related digital systems and gap analysis for quantum-vulnerable algorithms in current implementations
- IAEA NSS-17-T integration: incorporating quantum threat assessment into existing nuclear security plans and computer security programmes
- Safety system dependency mapping: identifying RSA/ECDSA/AES usage across reactor protection, SIS, ECCS, and digital I&C platforms with safety significance classification
- Consequence analysis: classifying cryptographic failure modes by nuclear safety category (safety-related, important-to-safety, non-safety) and regulatory notification thresholds
- Board-level governance: integrating quantum risk into nuclear safety committee reporting, investment case preparation, and proactive regulatory engagement strategy